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NOTES
respondent must be disbarred, but in case of any other crime the
disbarment would only follow if the court deemed the crime such as
showed him "to be unfit to be trusted in the duties of his profession."
By the new amendment disbarment for felony also is subject to this
same restriction, i.e., it must be adjudged that the felony is one
which shows the lawyer its unfit to be trusted. It may be argued
that the standing of the profession was better protected by a rule
which assumed that, regardless of individual professional trust-
worthiness, a convicted felon should be excluded from its ranks.
The other changer is an eminently practical and desirable one.
It confers power on the judge of the Superior Court to institute an
investigation into any reported cause for disbarment or suspension,
and to that end he may appoint three to five lawyers as commis-
sioners with power to summon and examine witnesses. Presumably,
however, the Committee on Grievances must still formally institute
final proceedings for disbarment or suspension, in the class of cases,
stated above, where it was formerly required to do so.
NOTES
THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
In Edna Ferber's comparatively recent novel, "Show Boat," she
introduced in one incident, a character called "Little Wayne Damron."
The possessor of that name sued the author, the publisher and a book-
seller, claiming a cause of action under sections 50 and 51 of the
New York Civil Rights Law. Recovery was not allowed.'
These sections of the statute were passed as the result of the
decision of the New York Court of Appeals in the case of Roberson
v. Rochester Folding Box Co.2 They provide that the name or picture
of a living person may not be used for purposes of advertising or
trade without his consent.3 They have been strictly construed, the
'Chap. 285, Laws of 1929.
'Damron v. Doubleday, Doran & Co., 231 N. Y. S. 444 (1928), commented
on in (1929) 42 Harv. L. Rev. 709.
3171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442, 59 L. R. A. 378, 89 Am. St. Rep. 828 (1902).
(Plaintiff's picture used on a flour advertisement. Injunction denied). This
case aroused a great deal of comment and criticism. The criticism moved
Judge O'Brien, at that time a member of the New York Court of Appeals, who
concurred in Judge Parker's majority opinion, to write a defense of the case
which appeared in (1902) 2 Col. L. Rev. 437. See also (1901) 1 Col. L. Rev.
491 and (1902) 2 Col. L. Rev. 486 (comments on the decisions in the Appellate
Division and Court of Appeals respectively).
'The constitutionality of the statute was upheld in Rhodes v. Sperry &
Hutchinson Co., 193 N. Y. 223, 85 N. E. 1097 (1908).
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court holding that the statute was aimed chiefly at the situation of
the Roberson case and had to be interpreted in that light.4
As a matter of statutory construction the decision in the instant
case is correct, but it serves to bring 'back into the legal limelight the
question of the right of privacy. The first serious plea for legal
recognition of a right of privacy in this country appeared in an article
by Messrs. Warren and Brandeis in the Harvard Law Review.5
Since that time the law reviews have waged a consistent fight for the
acknowledgment of the right.
The judges, however, have been more conservative than the editors,
and American authority is effectively split on the question. The cases
denying the existence of the right have placed 'their decisions on the
following grounds: (1) that there is no precedent;G (2) that it
would subject the courts to a flood of litigation;7 (3) that it would
curtail freedom of speech and of the press;" and (4), in cases where
an injunction was sought, that equity has jurisdiction only where
property rights (on the authority of Gee v. Pritchard)9 or breach
' Thus the instant case says the Roberson case indicates the mischief to be
suppressed. Jeffries v. N. Y. Evening Journal Pub. Co., 67 Misc. Rep. 570,
124 N. Y. S. 780 (1910) decided the statute did not apply to newspapers.
Humiston v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 189 App. Div. 467, 178 N. Y. S. 752
(1919), held it not applicable to news films. Other cases construing the statute
are Binns v. Vitagraph Co., 210 N. Y. 51, 103 N. E. 1108 (1913); Merle v.
Sociological Research Film Corp., 166 App. Div. 176, 152 N. Y. S. 829 (1915) ;
D'Altomonte v. N. Y. Herald Co., 154 App. Div. 453, 139 N. Y. S. 200 (1913) ;
Rosenwasser v. Ogoglio, 172 App. Div. 107, 158 N. Y. S. 56 (1916). See also
(1917) 17 Col. L. Rev. 735 and (1920) 20 Col. L. Rev. 100 (comments on
Humiston case), and note, (1911) 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1137.5 The Right to Privacy (1890) 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193.
'Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., supra note 2; Henry v. Cherry,
30 R. I. 13, 73 Atl. 97, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 991, 136 Am. St. Rep. 928, 18
Ann. Cas. 1006 (1909), commented on in (1909) 9 Col L. Rev. 641 and (1910)
8 Mich. L. Rev. 221; Hillman v. Star Publishing Co., 64 Wash. 691, 117 Pac.
594, 35 L. R. A. (N. S) 595 (1912), commented on in (1912) 46 Am. L. Rev.
587 and (1912) 10 Mich. L. Rev. 335, which admits there is a wrong but
says there is no remedy; Atkinson v. Doherty & Co., 121 Mich. 372, 80 N. W.
285, 46 L. R. A. 219, 80 Am. St. Rep. 507 (1899). These cases state that
the remedy must come by statute, but the New York Legislature is apparently
the only one which has acted upon the suggestion. See Wilbur Larremore,
The Law of Privacy (1912) 12 Col. L. Rev. 693, suggesting that a statute cover-
ing the advertising cases is comparatively easy to frame, but that in cases
of "absolute privacy" no statutory remedy is feasible.
Cases cited supra note 6.
' Cases cited supra note 6. The Hillman case is really the only one in which
the fact situation justifies a serious discussion of freedom of the press.
*2 Swanst. 402, 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (1818). An injunction was granted, on
the ground of literary property, to restrain the publication of letters written
by the plaintiff to defendant.
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of confidence or trust (on the authority of Prince Albert v. Strange) 0
are involved and cannot protect purely personal rights."'
The cases recognizing the right have answered: (1) that mere
lack of precedent should be no deterrent; that the case only offers
opportunity for a new application of an old principle--the constitu-
tionally-guaranteed right to personal liberty;12 (2) that recognition
of privacy would occasion no more unjustifiable litigation than the
recognition of any other right; that if cases are numerous it will only
indicate the usefulness of the remedy;13 (3) that privacy and free-
dom of speech and of the press are co-existent and compatible, not
mutually exclusive rights ;14 and (4) that the Chancellors in Gee
v. Pritchard and Prince Albert v. Strange, and particularly in the
former instance, merely seized upon the pretext of property rights
101 Macn. & G. 25, 2 De. G. & S. 652, 64 Eng. Rep. 293 (1849). Equity
on the grounds of property rights and breach of trust, restrained the publica-
tion of a description of plaintiff's etchings, at least by printing or writing,
though not by copy or resemblance.
" Probably the best analysis of the authorities before 1902, on the side
of strict construction, is to be found in the Roberson case. For a case typical
of the attitude that equity can interfere only where property rights are involved
see Brandreth v. Lance, 8 Paige (N. Y.) 24 (1839).. Cf. Mackenzie v. Soder
Mineral Springs Co., 18 N. Y. S. 240 (1891).
' Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S. E. 68, 69 L. R.
A. 101, 106 Am. St. Rep. 104, 2 Am. & Eng Ann. Cas. 561 (1905), commented
on in (1905) 5 Mich. L. Rev. 559; Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134
S. W. 1076 (1911). The Pavesich case states that lack of precedent is not
controlling, attempts to show a precedent by reference to Roman Law and
by drawing analogies to other situations in which the law protects personal
rights, and then brings privacy within the scope of the constitutional guaran-
tees. The Munden case holds that the novelty of the claim is no objection to
granting relief.
" Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., supra note 12. It may be of some
significance that in New York, where the court feared a flood of litigation, and
the Legislature passed a statute covering only a portion of privacy, litigation
has been frequent. In Georgia, on the other hand, where the court recognized
the whole right, only one case has since arisen which really involves the ques-
tion, and that case is not strictly one of privacy. .Stark v. Hamilton, 149
Ga. 227, 99 S. E. 861 (1919), commented on in (1920) 5 Cornell L. Q. 177,
where an injunction was granted restraining defendant, who had debauched
plaitiff's minor daughter, from communicating with her in any way. Cf.
Ex parte Warfield, 40 Tex; Crim. 413, 50 S. W. 933 (1899).
"Cases cited supra note 12; Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S. W.
967, 55 A. L. R. 964 (1927), commented on in (1928) 13 Cornell L. Q. 469
and (1928) 1 So. Cal. L. Rev. 293. In the advertising cases there is no real
necessity of raising the issue of freedom of the press, and in several sucl'
cases recognizing the right of privacy it has not been seriously raised. Foster-
Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 134 Ky. 424, 120 S. W. 364, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1137,
135 Am. St. Rep. 417 (1909); Kunz v. Allen, 102 Kan. 883, 172 Pac. 532,
L. R. A. 1918D 115 (1918).
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as a means of protecting the right of privacy in an era when the latter
right was unknown.15
It seems to the writer that the states in which the question has
not yet -been litigated, among which is North Carolina, should have
little difficulty in allowing recovery, when occasion does arise, in at
least one class of cases-those where a person's name or picture has
'been unauthorizedly used for commercial purposes. And this is true
even though they adopt the narrow test of a property right. The
enormous increase in testimonial advertising has demonstrated be-
yond a doubt that a name or picture capable of use in such a connec-
nection is worth money. This economic interest must be recog-
nized, either upon the theory that the plaintiff can sell it himself or
upon the theory that the defendant, by his use of it, has admitted
its value. 16 And if the court wishes to place the decision upon a
This construction was forcibly urged by Messrs. Warren and Brandeis,
op. cit. supra note 5, and in (1927) 25 Mich. L. R. 889. It was adopted by the
Pavesich case, supra note 12. Munden v. Harris, supra note 12, finds a property
right in a picture. Douglas v. Stokes, 149 Ky. 506, 149 S. W. 849, 42 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 386, Ann. Cas 1914B 374 (1912) thinks it would be a reproach to
the law if incorporeal injuries could not be recovered for. These cases, how-
ever, are all damage suits and not prayers for injunction. But see the dictum
in Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, 72 N. J. Eq. 910, 67 Atl. 97 (1907), stating that
equity has jurisdiction where property rights are not involved, citing the
Pavesich case as authority.
The question of privacy is only one phase of the battle over property rights
and the construction of Gee v. Pritchard. It involves the wholq field of equitable
jurisdiction over injuries to personality. See, on common law rights to intel-
lectual productions, note (1901) 51 L. R. A. 353 and (1926) 12 Va. L. Rev.
656; and on rights of the owner of a photograph see note (1901) 50 L. R. A.
397 and note (1907) 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 362. On the general subject of rights
of personality (including privacy) see: Pound, Equitable Relief against Defa-
nation and Iniuries to Personality (1916) 29 Harv. L. Rev. 640; Long, Equit-
able Jurisdiction to Protect Personal Rights (1923) 33 Yale L. J.'115; Larre-
more, op. cit. supra: note 6; note (1921) 14 A. L. R. 295; note (1897) 37 L. R.
A. 783; (1927) 25 Mich. L. Rev. 889; (1917) 1 Minn. L. Rev. 71; (1920) 5
Cornell L. Q. 177.
' See note (1910) 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 991. And Munden v. Harris,
supra note 12, takes the attitude that if peculiarities of a person's appearance
are to be a matter of merchandise it should be for his profit. In contrast with
this is Judge O'Brien's attitude (op. cit. supra note 2) : "A woman's beauty,
next to her virtue, is her earthly crown, but it would be a degradation to hedge
it about by rules and principles applicable to property in land or chattels."
If the present fad for testimonial advertising continues it is conceivable that
plaintiffs will prefer to bring their actions in such cases upon the theory of prop-
erty rather than of privacy because: (1) it will be difficult to convince a jury
that plaintiff has been substantially mortified (except perhaps in cases where
the commodity advertised is of questionable nature) in an era when no stigma
attaches to an appearance in a testimonial capacity; and (2) if the plaintiff
has permitted his name and picture to be used by one advertiser, subsequent un-
authorized use by another will hardly be a serious invasion of privacy but will
involve considerable damage to the property right.
NOTES
broader basis and recognize the right of privacy, it no longer faces an
absence of precedent.
Privacy, however, included more than prevention of commercial
use. The question has arisen in the following illustrative cases: news-
paper, in connection with its story of an indictment for fraud, print-
ing a picture of the suspect's daughter ;17 placing plaintiff's picture
in the rogue's gallery before conviction;18. "shadowing" by private
detectives;19 publishing a biography and picture of the plaintiff's
deceased husband;20 exhibiting a bust of the plaintiff's deceased
relative as the ideal feminine philanthropist ;21 using plaintiff's pic-
ture in an actors' popularity contest;22 placing a large sign in a
garage window stating that the plaintiff owed the owner money ;23
copyrighting pictures of plaintiff's deformed children;24 unauthor-
" Hillman v. Star Publishing Co., supra note 6. No recovery allowed in
suit for damages. Court calls the authority recognizing privacy "instructive."
'Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 115 La. 479, 39 So 499 (1905), 117 La. 708,
42 So. 228 (1906) ; Schulman v. Whitaker, 117 La. 704, 42 So. 227 (1906).
Injunctions granted in both cases. The right of privacy is apparently assumed,
the court stating that equity will protect such an invasion of private rights,
and that every one who does not violate the law can insist upon being let alone.
The court, however, considers the cases only remotely analogous to cases of
the type of the Roberson case.
" Chapell v. Stewart, 82 Md. .323, 33 Atl. 542, 37 L. R. A. 783 (1896). In-
junction denied, court holding that ordinary processes of law are fully compe-
tent to redress all injuries of this kind and that equity has no jurisdiction to
protect personal rights. But Schultz v. Frankfort Marine, etc. Ins. Co., 151
Wis. 537, 139 N. W. 386, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 520 (1913), held that "shadowing"
damaging the plaintiff's reputation constituted a cause of action apart from
physical restraint. The case apparently did not turn on the issue of privacy,
but obviously one of the rights protected by the decision is that of privacy.
C Gorliss v. Walker, 57 Fed. 434 (1893), 64 Fed. 280, 31 L. R. A. 283(C. C. D. Mass. 1894). Injunction denied because Corliss was a public
character. Court, by way of -dictum, says that a private individual has the
-right to be protected against the representation of his picture in any form,
and that this is a property as well as a personal right.
'Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N. Y. 434, 31 L. R. A. 286 (1895). Injunction
denied, court holding that even if privacy exists it is purely personal and abates
with the death of the person; that plaintiff must stand on some injury to him-
self and such cannot be shown by proving that the deceased would have
objected during her lifetime.
'Marks v. Jaffa, 6 Misc. Rep. 290, 26 N. Y. S. 908 (1893). Injunction
granted by Superior Court of .New York City on ground that equity will
protect the right to be let alone. This case is weakened as authority because
it was decided by an inferior court in New York before the decision of the
Robersoq case (which distinguished it).
' Brents v. Morgan, supra note 14. In sending the case back for a new
trial the court held that damages would be recoverable for invasion of privacy.
In cases of this nature a count in libel may usually be joined because there is an
inference that the plaintiff is trying to evade the payment of his just debts.
For cases involving actionable methods of attempting to collect debts see note(1928) 55 A. L. R. 971.
"' Douglas v. Stokes, supra note 15. The children were dead. Defendant,
a photographer, made several photographs above the number he contracted to
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izedly taking pictures of a polar expedition ;25 and filing a false birth
certificate attributing to the plaintiff the fatherhood of an illegiti-
mate child.28
Assuming that the present trend is toward the recognition of
privacy, the ultimate questions, at least in damage suits, become:
what must be alleged to state a cause of action and what proof of
damages is necessary? It seems that special damages need neither
be alleged nor proved 27 (except, perhaps, in the case of a corpora-
tion),28 though they might be shown in aggravation. It is only
necessary to state such facts as show an invasion of privacy and
generally to allege -humiliation and suffering.
Proof of this general allegation of humiliation and mortification
could be furnished by the testimony of the plaintiff himself 29 and
by the testimony of friends and acquaintances concerning their
reaction to the matter in litigation. The injury to privacy is sub-
jective, as distinguished from the objective injury involved in defa-
mation; yet it is undoubtedly true that the spiritual injury arises
out of knowledge of the effect the invasion of privacy will have upon
the minds of others. Hence the testimony of friends should be ad-
missable as evidence from which the jury could infer that the plain-
tiff was humiliated. ° In the last analysis recovery rests upon
make. Damages allowed. The decision is based on breach of confidence, but
the court, in a dictum, says that plaintiff could have recovered had defendant
attempted to exhibit the bodies. Such an action would be based upon the
right of privacy.
'Smith v. Surratt, 7 Alaska Rep. 416 (1926), commented on in (1929) 27
Mich. L. Rev. 353. Injunction denied. This case was a controversy between
the Pathe and International News Services and, though the right of privacy
is expressly raised, the case really smacks more of unfair competition than
of privacy. See infra note 35.
'Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, supra note 15. Injunction granted because of
property rights involved. But the court expressly states that it would grant
relief regardless of the property rights.
This, like most of the law of privacy, was suggested by Warren and
Brandeis. The Pavesich case made it law. It has since been approved by
Munden v. Harris, supra note 12; Foster Milburn Co. v. Chinn; Brents v.
Mort-an: and Kunz v. Allen, all supra note 14.
'This qualification is based on an analogy to defamation. And Vassar
College v. Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co., 197 Fed. 982 (D. C. W. D. Mo. 1912), in
'refusing an injunction mentioned, among other things, that no special damages
were alleged. See infra note 39.
'This seems fairly obvious, yet in some cases it might be impractical.
For instance, in the case of Munden v. Harris, supra note 12, the plaintiff was
five years old. His age was not discussed in connection with the count for
the invasion of privacy, though it was considered in connection with the count
for libel.
o No direct authority is found to sustain this proposition. The point has
not, apparently, been squarely raised. In Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn, supra
note 14, the court held that plaintiff was properly allowed to show that he had
NOTES
whether or not the jury believes the plaintiff actually suffered mor-
tification and mental anguish.3 '
On principle there should be no difference between the action for
damages and the bill in equity insofar as sufficiency of complaint
and proof are concerned. Only two differences are likely to arise.
(1) In an advertising case, if the prayer is for an injunction and an
accounting, whatever is allowed on the accounting would be in the
nature of recovery for profits made by wrongful use of plaintiff's
property rather than in the nature of compensation for injury to plain-
tiff's sensibilities.3 2  (2) In a state where the question first arises in
equity the bill might be demurrable if the court takes the traditional
attitude that equity will not interfere unless the right has been
recognized at law.33 As a practical matter, however, equity has often
set its own standards of conduct in injunction cases. And further,
as heretofore pointed out, there is no longer a lack of legal precedent
recognizing the right.
Certain limitations upon the right were suggested by Messrs.
Warren and Brandeis. These limitations, based upon analogies to
the law of defamation and of literary property, are apparently sound
been ridiculed and laughed at by his friends, such evidence being competent
to show -his mortification. This holding was in connection with the libel
side of the case, but mortification is one of the chief elements of damage in
privacy and hence such evidence should be admissable in privacy actions.
And in Kunz v. Allen, siqprao note 14, the court remarks that the trial judge
unduly limited plaintiff's proof that the publication caused her to be talked
about.
If the witnesses testified, however, that the publication did not lessen their
opinion of the plaintiff it does not follow as a necessary inference that the
plaintiff suffered no damage. This situation arose in the Kunz case and the
court held that it merely proved the sincerity of the friendship entertained by
the witnesses for the plaintiff.
' In Brents v. Morgan, supra note 14, the court, in remanding the cause
for a new trial, outlined an instruction for the jury providing, in substance,
that if the jury believed that the plaintiff actually suffered "mental pain, humil-
iation and mortification' they should allow recovery. In Schuyler v. Curtis,
supra note 21, however, one of the grounds for refusing an injunction was that
the defendants had done nothing which would affect unpleasantly the mental
condition of any "sound, reasonable, lintelligent man or woman." But
damages in privacy should be based on actual injury, as in the Brents case,
and not on reasonability. And the jury will, of its own accord, place enough
restraint upon recovery by way of demanding reasonability. See Larremore,
op. cit. supra note 6.
"If the accounting is allowed, thus recognizing the property right, it will
bring the case within even the narrow test of Gee v. Pritchard. And such
allowance of an accounting will furnish an additional reason why plaintiffs
will prefer to bring their actions on the theory of property rights. See note 16,
sup ra.
' For a general discussion of equity's jurisdiction and attitude in tort
cases see Chafee, Does Equity Follow the Law of Torts? (1926) 75 Pa. L
Rev. 1.
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and have found considerable favor. 4  They are: (1) privacy does
not prohibit publication of matter which is of general or public
interest;35 (2) privacy does not prohibit publication under circum-
stances which would render it privileged under the law of defama-
tion; 36 (3) there should be no redress for an oral publication unless
special damages be shown; (4) the right ceases upon publicatiQn by
the individual or with his consent;87 (5) truth of the matter pub-
lished is no defence;38 (6) absence of malice is no defence. To
these should be added the limitation that some distinction should be
drawn between individual and corporate privacy.89 And, carrying
the analogy to defamation a little further, it may be supposed that
proof of actual malice would vitiate the defence of privilege.
It has been suggested that recognition of privacy will open up too
-broad a field and put the courts to the necessity of having to exclude
many cases; and that the most effective way to handle the matter
would be to have an action for "wrongful publicity" causing senti-
Practically every case recognizing the right of privacy cites the Warren-
Brandeis article. And Brents v. Morgan, supra note 14, takes up each of the
limitations and expressly approves them.
"5 Thus a man who has become a public character to some extent sacrifices
his right of privacy. Corliss v. Walker, supra note 20. Objection has been
made to this on the grounds of difficulty of application. But certainly it will
be no harder to apply than the negligence test. The test is essentially one for
the jury and should be whether, under the circumstances, the publication is
legitimate because of the plaintiff's connection with public life or an event
of public interest. For a case involving an event of public interest see Smith
v. Surratt, supra note 25, holding that there is no right of privacy where
a polar expedition is involved. In general see Larremore, op. cit. mpra note 6
and (1912) 10 Mich. L. Rev. 335. This limitation should be of no importance
in the advertising cases.
"There is apparently no direct authority on this. However, in Folsom v.
Marsh, 2 Story 100, Fed. Cas. No. 4, 901 (C. C. D. Mass. 1841), in a case
involving property rights in letters, the court recognizes that the recipient may
publish them to vindicate his character or to establish a legal right.
' Such consent need not be express; it may be implied. Munden v. Harris,
supra note 12.
"In Brents v. Morgan, supra note 14, the court allowed recovery for inva-
sion of privacy though a statute made truth a defence to libel in every case.
This is the greatest difference between defamation and privacy, and privacy
offers a welcome loop-hole by which to escape the ironclad rule of justification
in the law of defamation. See Wettach, Recent Developments in Newspaper
Libel (1928) 7 N. C. L. Rev. 3, 11.
"There may be some doubt as to whether a corporation has a right of pri-
vacy. Vassar College v. Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co., supra note 28, apparently
the only case in which the plaintiff is a corporation, denied the existence of any
right of privacy and hence did not discuss the secondary question. Obviously,
however, a corporation cannot suffer humiliation and mortification in the same
sense that an individual can. If it is to be given a right of privacy such right
must be a limited one. Probably it should be limited to cases where the cor-
porate name was being illegitimately employed, where the law of unfair compe-
tition would not offer redress, and where special damages could be shown.
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mental injury, which would include defamation and a properly limited
privacy.4 0 This suggestion is hardly practical. Defamation and
privacy are closely related and supplementary, but they would hardly
make good bedfellows. Any attempt to combine the two immediately
meets the difficulties that truth is a defence in defamation and that
equity will not enjoin a libel. If these distinctions are kept then there
is no advantage to be gained from the fusion; if they are not kept
then the fusion results in an upheaval in the law of defamation
which will be much more shocking to the legalistic mind than the
mere recognition of privacy. And to give a "wrongful publicity"
action merely as a limited right of privacy, exclusive of the question
of defamation, would serve only to make a somewhat arbitrary divi-
sion of a general right, would meet with the same difficulties now
confronting the growth of the law of privacy, and would probably
result in the exclusion of more than one legitimate case unfortunate
enough to differ in degree though not in kind. The best solution
seems to be to continue along the trail now blazed by authority.
HENRY BRANDIs, JR.
ADMISSIBILITY OF PHOTOGRAPHS AS EVIDENCE
Long ago, the poet Horace spoke of the greater effect of that
which is seen than of that which is described by words.' There
are three ways of appealing to the eyes of the jury: (1) by produc-
tion of the "primary real evidence", 2 a thing or object for the per-
"Note (1910) 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 991. The argument is that the phrase,
"wrongful publicity" presupposes that there are forms of publicity which are
not actiqnable, and thus the field is limited.
"'Aut agitur res in scenis, aut acta refertur,
Segnius irritant animos demissa per aurem,
Quam quae sunt oculis subjecta fidelibus, et quae
Ipse sibi sibi tradit spectator' (Horatius ad Pisones)."
See Warlick v. White, 76 N. C. 175, 179. For effective use of photographs
in disputed document cases, see OsBoaR, THE PROBLEm OF PROOF (1922). In gen-
eral, see 2 WIGMoaR, EVmENCE, ch. 37, p. 1344, "Autoptic Proference."
" The classification by Bentham of all evidence into real evidence, as the evi-
dence of things, and personal evidence as that of persons, has inaugurated a
long train of errors in the theory of proof: see GULSON, PHILOSOPHY OF
PROOF. (2d Ed. 1923). Mr. Gulson says real evidence differs from per-
sonal only in the mode in which a fact is laid before the tribunal. "It is evi-
dence obtained by the court through the mere exercise of its own perceptive
faculties, while 'personal' as defined by Mr. Best, is the evidence acquired
through the perceptions of other persons or witnesses, who report or com-
municate their experience to, the tribunal."
"Primary evidence" of a thing is the term applied by our jurists to the real
evidence of its own nature afforded by the production in court of the thing
or document itself; any other mode of proving the terms of the document
or the nature of the thing being designated by the phrase "secondary evidence":
GutsoN, PHILOSOPHY OF PROOF. (2 Ed. 1923), p. 258.
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sonal examination of the tribunal; (2) by photographs,8 radiographs,
skiagraphs, etc.; (3) by maps, 4 diagrams, models,5 miniatures. Each
requires identification as evidence.0 Without it, they are valueless, as
"testimonial non-entities," 7 no more admissible than an anonymous
letter. As to the accuracy and reliability of transmission from actu-
ality, apart from the oath of the witness identifying them, they vary
greatly. The first class is conclusive as to the nature of the object
produced; the second is somewhat less accurate, depending upon the
nature of the thing reproduced, and the certainty of the process and
the skill of the photographer; the items of the third class have no
reliability except insofar as the witness explains them and vouches
for their correctness.
A foundation for the admission of the ordinary photograph may
be laid down in two ways.8 A witness who is familiar with the per-
'Photographs' are within the class of real, or immediate, evidence, where
a re-production of the thing comes under the cognizance of the senses. WIG-
oRE, EvIDENcE, §790; 4 JONES, EvmnzxcE (2d. Ed. 1926) §1749, p. 3210.
"While embodying some elements of "autoptic proference," in that they
express a meaning through sense of sight, maps and diagrams are transmitted
evidence, -rather than immediate evidence.
Evidence has been divided into "(1) immediate, where the inquirer or
recipient of the evidence ascertains the proximate fact, i.e., the fact whether
principal or evidentiary, which is the actual subject of proof, by means of his
own individual perceptions; and (2) Transmitted where he ascertains the same
fact through the medium of the perceptive faculties of some other person,
whose knowledge of the fact is manifested to him by some voluntary act;
that is to say, either by the utterance of language written or spoken, or
by voluntary signs or gestures, or even by general conduct, and behaviour; all
which spontaneous manifestations or indications of knowledge may be summed
up under the title of 'communications'". GULSON, PHILOSOPHY OF PROOF,
p. 122.
Artistic reproductions of situation, or tableaux vivants, however, have been
excluded by courts admitting photographs of actual scenes of inanimate ob-
jects: Rodick v. Me. Cent. R. Co. 109 Me. 530, 85 Atl. 41 (1912); Colonial
Refining Co. v. Lathrop, 64 Okla. 47, 166 Pac. 747, L. R. A. 1917 F 890 (1917);
Fore v. State, 75 Miss. 727, 23 So. 710 (1898).
'WIGMORO, Evidence §§790, 793. The authenticity of the first type depends.
upon oral testimony identifying the thing with the inquiry; authenticity of
photographs depends upon both identification of subject matter and verification
of the reproduction.
SWic.mon, Evidence §792.
'Baustian v. Young, 152 Mo. 317, 53 S. W. 921, 75 Am. St. Rep. 462, and
note (1899); Louisville v. Brown, 127 Ky. 732, 106 S. W. 795, 13 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 1135 (1908) ; McKarren v. Boston, 194 Mass. 179, 80 N. E. 477, 10'
Ann. Cas. 961 (1907) ; Carlson v. Benton, 66 Neb. 486, 92 N. W. 600 (1902) ;
Alberti v. Railroad, 118 N. Y. 77, 23 N. E. 35, 6 L. R. A. 765 (1889);
Dederichs v. Salt Lake, 14 Utah 137, 46 Pac. 656, 35 L. R. A. 802 and note
(1896) ; Selleck v. Janesville, 104 Wis. 570, 47 L. R. A. 691, 80 N. W. 944(1899).
The extent of the discretion of the trial court in admitting or excluding
photographs as evidence does not differ from that which it exercises with
respect to other kinds of evidence: note 35 L. R. A. 805. Most cases exclud-
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son, place, thing or condition which the picture purports to represent
may testify that it correctly portrays this thing. Or the accuracy of
the picture may be established by testimony of the photographer,
that it is the result of a process mechanically reliable. The term
accuracy as here used means only reasonable accuracy for the pur-
pose of informing the jury.9 As stated -by Professor Wigmore, a
photograph is somebody's non-verbal testimony ;1o hence on the one
hand it can be received only when verified by a witness competent
to speak to the facts represented, and on the other hand, the maker
is immaterial, provided'a competent witness verifies it. Where its
general correctness is verified, the photograph is direct evidence
of things therein which have not been specifically described by the
witness as having come within his observation."
The basic precautionary rules which apply to all evidence apply
here as well. The subject matter of the picture must be rele-
vant to the issues, and must not be misleading in nature, or such
as to stir the passion or prejudice of the jury.12 If inspection of the
thing itself, produced before the tribunal, is proper, then the photo-
graph is competent.' 3 The possibility of the photograph misrep-
resenting by intentional distortion is of itself no objection to the
admissibility, "any more than is the possibility of an oral witness so
twisting his tongue as to lie about what he saw."'14 Against possible
misrepresentation, intentional or unintentional, an adequate protec-
ing photographs do so because of improper verification or change in surround-
ings when taken: 55 A. L. R. 1345 note.
'Leland v. Leonard, 74 Vt. 496, 112 Atl. 198 (1921).
" 2 WIGMORE, Evidence §§790, 793 (1904). Clark, C. J., dissenting in Hamp-
ton v. R. R. Co., 120 N. C. 534, 27 S. E. 963 (1897) says: "A map not made
under the order of the court is really only the declaration, so to speak, of the
party making it. Its reliability depends entirely upon his accuracy, and con-
scientiousness, and is therefore only admissible as his evidence, and because it
may convey to the eyes of the jury somewhat more accurately the description
which the witness was endeavoring to convey to their ears by his oral testimony:'
' 10 R. C. L. 357, p. 1155, note 4; Baustian v. Young, supra note 7, where
it is said: "It is not admissible in evidence at all until it is proven by testi-
mony aliunde to be a true photographic print of the thing in question, but
after that foundation has been laid, the photograph speaks with a certain
probative force in itself."
"2 Wim omR. Evidence §§1154-59 (1904). In Brown v. Mutual Life Ins.
Co., 65 Mich. 306, 32 N. W. 610, 8 Am. St. Rep. 894 (1887), the court rejected a
photograph offered to show g6od health, taking judicial notice that a photo-
grapher's business was to make the sitter appear at his best. If the true
situation or nature of the object is not apprehensible from observation of the
photograph, oral testimony may be required in explanation.
" The granting or refusal of a view by the jury has been within the sound
discretion of the trial court. Jenkins v. R. R., 110 N. C. 438, 15 S. E. 193
(1892) ; State v. Perry, 121 N. C. 533, 27 S. E. 997 (1897).
"42 WIGMORE, Evidence §792 (1904).
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tion is a careful cross-examination regarding the process by which
the picture was made.14
As against this background, the North Carolina court says that
a photograph is not admissible as "substantive evidence," or even
"as evidence," but "merely for the purpose of allowing the witness
to illustrate his testimony."' 5
In Honeycutt v. Cherokee Brick Co.,15 photographs of the ma-
chine, upon which it was alleged the deceased was killed, and the
surroundings and attachments thereof, were offered in evidence.
There was evidence tending to show that these photographs cor-
rectly represented the machine and the surroundings, and they were
received in evidence generally, over the objection (which was gen-
eral) of the defendant. Held: The admission of the photographs "as
substantive evidence" constituted error. New trial.
Then what is evidence ?16 All three of the above means of ap-
pealing to the jury constitute evidence. The map or diagram is
expressive only when coupled with the explanation of the witness;
it is of evidentiary value as to the character of its subject only as a part
of the witness's testimony, similar to a memorandum admitted as
"past recollection recorded."17  When used, it comes before the jury
"as evidence," nevertheless. A photograph purporting to represent
the actual situation or object existing at the time of the event or
injury complained of, is self-explanatory. While adopted as the
testimony of the witness, it goes far beyond any possible oral descrip-
tion.
Then is a photograph "substantive evidence"? The first use of
this term was to distinguish evidence offered upon an issue in the
case from impeaching evidence.13 If the photograph is relevant
at all here, it is material upon the issue in the case.19 *As an attempt
"Honeycutt v. Cherokee Brick Co., 196 N. C. 556, 146 S. E. 227 (1929);
Kepley v. Kirk, 191 N. C. 690, 132 S. E. 788 (1926), involving use of a map.
" "Evidence is any matter of fact which is furnished to a legal tribunal
otherwise than by reasoning or a reference to what is noticed without proof-
as the basis of inference in ascertaining some other matter of fact," Thayer,
Presumptions and the Law of Evidence 3 Harv. Law Rev. 142 (1889). See
1 WIGMoaE, EVIDENCE: §1: "Any knowable fact or group of facts not a legal
or a logical principle, considered with a view to its being offered before a
legal tribunal for the purpose of producing a conviction, positive or negative,
on the part of the tribunal, as to the truth of a proposition, not of law or of
logic, on which the determination of the tribunal is to be asked."
"WGmoPE, EvmiDEc §791, note 2.
Medlin v. Co. Board of Education, 167 N. C. 239, 83 S. E. 483 (1914).19A possible misconception of the photograph as evidence is indicated by
the headnote in the official report of I-Ioneycutt v. Brick Co., supra note 14,
where it is stated that the error of lower court was "admission of such photo-
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to relegate photographs from the superior realm of immediate evi-
dence, to the inferior plane of transmitted evidence, the limitation
is of no substantial effect. 20 Possibly, it is a distinction between
the formal introduction of a photograph as part of the record, 21
as a document, and the informal production to the jury by the
witness, the latter being the usual practice. It is to be observed that
the admission of photographs under the view prevailing in other
jurisdictions, without the distinction bet-ween "substantive' and
"illustrative" evidence, would not be admitting them as "orginal"
or "independent" evidence. Although appealing to the senses, their
character as secondary evidence requiring verification can not be lost
sight of. 22 If the expression of our court is used in the sense that
the photograph requires authentication by a witness as a correct rep-
resentation, then its use is intelligible; but there is no reason to
require that the jury be told about this, because when.admitted it is
apparent of all men that it has been authenticated.
Probably in the minds of the court is the idea that the jury should
be told of the possibility of error in fransmission, in reproduction of
the situation or object, since the man in the street might assume the
photograph was necessarily accurate.23 This objection, however,
graph as substantive evidence of the master's failure to supply his servant
with safe tools." The photograph is proper evidence of the nature of the
machine, and if the defect is apparent from a view of the machine, the picture
is proper to show this fact. Cf. Baustian v. Young, supra note 7.
So Supra note 4; GuLsox, PHIaosoPay OF PRoor, p. 140: "The true test of
the distinction between immediate and transrmitted evidence-between facts that
are either actually perceived or legitimately inferred from others that are
perceived, and facts that are only communicated-is the question, whether,
in each case, the fact which is the subject of our inquiry be, or be not, as it
were, vitiated by passing in its course to us through the mind (i.e., from the
knowledge to the will) or some other rational agent."
In -Angelo v. Winston-Salem, 193 N. C. 207, 209, photographs of the
market under consideration were "filed as exhibits," reproduced in the report
and said to "fully corroborate the statements" of the court as to equipment
of market. No jury was had here, however. Also in Parker v. R. R., 181
N. C. 95, 100, 106 S. E. 755 (1921), the railroad crossing scene was reproduced
and apparently used before the jury without objection.
'But such misconception of the nature of the photograph as evidence is
indicated in Hanipton v. R. R., supra note 9, where it is said: ". . . it seems
to have been altogether proper to exclude the photograph whether introduced
as original, independent evidence or as an unauthorized map." See supra note 2;
WxGsoax, EvrDENcE §790. Photographs are never primary or original evi-
dence except where the issues turn about -the photograph as an object in itself,
such as in a prosecution for sale of obscene pictures, as in People v. Muller,
96 N. Y. 408, 48 Am. Rep. 635 (1884).
1 Of course, they are never conclusive or unimpeachable: Higgs v. Minn.
St. P. and S. St. M. Ry. Co., 16 N. D. 446, 15 L. P_ A. (N. S.) 1162, 114
N. W. 722, 15 Anno. Cas. 97 note (1908), rest upon human testimony and un-
verified carry no conviction as to correctness; Baustian v. Young, supra note 7.
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goes to the weight of the photograph as evidence, rather than to its
admissibility. If that :be the meaning, the rule ought to require
explicit caution by the court to the jury, upon request to that effect,
as in the case of testimony of interested parties. The omission to
give such caution, unless specifically requested, ought not be grounds
for reversal.
The origin of the expression "not admissible as substantive evi-
dence but merely aA illustrative of the testimony," in our cases, is
vague. The first case involving the admissibility of photographs, ex-
cluded them from evidence because taken two years after the time
of the event under inquiry.24 In the next case, photographs of the
deceased child before and after injury, but before death, were ad-
mitted generally without any instructions that they were not substan-
tive evidence. 25 Also, photographs of cattle at the depot of the
defendant were held "admissible in evidence when shown to be a
true representation and to have been taken under proper safe-
guards."26 It does not appear that these views were repudiated by
the court before the case of Honeycutt vs. Brick Company.27 The
expression later appears in cases where the admission of photographs
as "illustrative" evidence was approved, there being intimations by
the court that they would not have been admissible for any other
"purpose". 28 It is probable that the expression was originally used
The fear of the courts in this direction is indicated by Prof. Wigmore:
"Does it purport to be a picture of the place of a murder? We look at it with
an interest based on the unconscious assumption that it is that house. In short,
we unwittingly give the document the credit of speaking for itself; though no
human being has yet spoken for it. Now this tendency has to be sternly re-
pressed; and ... so it is here that the tendency has so frequently to be struck
at by judicial rulings." WIGfo0Rr, EviDEimcE §790.
"'Hampton v. R. R., supra note 9, Clark, C. J. dissenting.
'Davis v. R. R., 136 N. C. 115, 48 S. E. 591 (1904).
'Bane v. R. M, 171 N. C. 328, 88 S. E. 477 (1916).
' Supra note 15.
' In Pickett v. R. M., 153 N.C. 148, 69 S. E. 81 (1910), where inquiry was
as to effect of diversion of water upon land, witness was allowed to use photo
taken after change of course of the water, to describe the condition of the land
previous to the taking of the picture.
Hoyle v. Hickory, 167 N. C. 619, 83 S. E. 758 (1914) : "If the lot continued
to be washed by surface water, it was competent to be shown by witnesses, with
aid of picture, reproduced exactly like the true situation. It might be im-
possible to illustrate it, or to give the jury a correct idea of the damage, if any,
in any other way."
In State v. Jones, 175 N. C. 709, 95 S. E. 576 (1918), the photograph pur-
ported to represent how metal parts found on defendant's premises might be
assembled to form a whiskey still, the arrangement requiring explanation to be-
come fully intelligible to jury. Here Clark, C. J., in opinion of the court says:
"A trial is a search for truth, and no court will exclude testimony that will
be an aid to that end, whether it is oral testimony, a photograph ... subject
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in reference to diagrams which were unintelligible to the jury, or
meaningless, without explanation of the witness; and the court
applied the expression to the use of photographs generally without
adverting to the fact that some photographs are intelligible without
explanation. The photographs introduced in the cases where is found
this limitation, either were not representations of the actual situa-
tions or were not intelligible apart from testimony of the witness.
Notwithstanding intimations in these cases, the court admitted X-ray
photographs as evidence for the consideration of the jury in a recent
decision, "upon the same basis as .photographs."29
It is submitted that the photographs in the Honeycutt case were
properly authenticated, and warranted consideration by the jury as
to the nature of the machine upon which it was alleged deceased was
killed. The instructions to the jury that they were not "substantive
evidence," the omission of which caused a reversal, it is believed,
would have been entirely without useful influence upon the jury's
consideration of them.
JoaN H. ANDERSON, JR.
ADVISORY OPINIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA
The Senate of North Carolina forwarded a resolution to the
Supreme Court of North Carolina, requesting advice on the consti-
tutionality of two bills proposing changes in the system of Superior
Courts. A letter in reply, signed by the Chief Justice, expressed
the view that the members of the Court would -be willing to follow
the precedent of their predecessors in giving opinions to the legisla-
to ... (best evidence rule) ... and cross-examination and opposing evi-
dence."
State v. Kee, 186 N. C. 473, 119 S. E. 893 (1923), involved map drawn on
floor, which it was said was not "evidence."
State v. Lutterloh, 188 N. C. 412, 124 S. E. 752 (1924), photograph of re-
constructed scene admissible as "illustrative evidence," explanation of the recon-
structed scene being necessary by witness.
State v. Mitchen, 188 N. C. 608, 125 S. E. 190 (1924), admission as "illustra-
tive evidence" approved.
In Elliott v. Power Co., Varsar, J., said: "It was not error for the court
to allow the jury to consider the pictures for this purpose (explaining witness's
testimony) and to give thein smch weight if any, as the jury may find they are
entitled in explaining the testimony." (Italics ours).
State v. Mathews, 191 N. C. 378, 131 S. E. 743 (1926), is probably the
strongest suport for Honeycutt v. Brick Co., supra note 14. In that case, how-
ever, the photographs were of tableaux vivants, the reconstructed scene of the
crime, the admission of which would have been held error by courts which admit
photographs of the actual, unreconstructed scenes, supra note 5.
Lupton v. Express Co., 169 N. C. 675, 86 S. E. 583 (1915). See 2 WIGUORE,
EVIDENCE §795; Wilson, The X-Ray in Court, 7 CORNELL L. QT. 203.
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tive department, when it appeared that z course of action had been
agreed upon, which involved constitutional questions affecting the
governmental structure and matters of grave public moment, but
that in the present instance the fact that the resolution had been
addressed to the court in its official capacity and the fact that the two
bills showed there 'had been no agreed course of action, prevented
the expression of opinions.1
Before the adoption of the Constitution of 1868, there were two
instances in which requests for advisory opinions were granted. The
first was a contested election -before the Senate which involved the
question of eligibility to vote.2 The second was an opinion on the
meaning of the word "crime", given at the request of the governor.3
Under the Constitution in force before 1868, the duties of the Court
were not prescribed, but were subject to control by the legislature. 4
There is no evidence or intimation in the two opinions of that period
that the legislature ever made it the duty of the Supreme Court to
render advisory opinions.5 The weight given to such opinions was
not that attached to a judicial decision and their conclusions were
not considered as binding.6
The Constitution of 1868 provided for the separation of the
powers of the three departments of government and gave the Supreme
Court a constitutional jurisdiction. When the matter arose for
the first time under this constitution, two of the justices took the
view that it prohibited the giving of advisory opinons, but the remain-
ing three took the view that the members of the Court, as justices,
might render such opinions as acts of courtesy and respect to the
'In the matter of Advisory Opinions, 196 N. C. Appendix (1929).
'Waddell v. Berry, 31 N. C. Appendix (1849).
'In the matter of Hughes, 61 N. C. 57, 64 (1867).
'Stacy, Brief Review of the Supreme Court of North Carolina (1926)4 N. C. LAw Rxvimw 115, stating that the Supreme Court of North Carolina
was created by a legislative enactment in November,- 1818, and that until 1868
the Legislature had the power at any time to abolish the Supreme Court and
the power to elect the members of the Court.5 In Waddell v. Berry, supra note 2, Ruffin, C. J., said: "Although not strictly
an act of official obligation, which could not be declined, yet from the nature of
the questions and the purposes to which the answers are to be applied-being
somewhat of a judicial character-the Judges have deemed it a duty of courtesy
and respect to the Senate to consider the points submitted to them and to give
their opinions thereon."
' State v. Ragland, 75 N. C. 12, 13 (1876), stating: "This conclusion is con-
trary to the opinion of the judges in the contested election case. Waddell v.
Berry (1848) 31 N. C. 319. We do not feel ourselves bound by the opinion in
that case, because it was not a judicial opinion, that is, not given in any case
which the court had jurisdiction to decide, and the reasoning is almost alto-
gether technical."
NOTES
legislative department. 7  The latter view has persisted.8  Such ad-
vice is not an official obligation, there is no authority to render it
voluntarily, but it may be given, when requested. These advisory
opinions have been cited in regularly decided cases as persuasive
authority,9 but not as binding precedents. Obviously, the Court in
the principal case was called on to decide a question smacking mainly
of legislative policy. Its refusal of advice seems sound.
The well established and long continued practice in England by
which the Crowa and the House of Lords consulted the judges on
matters of great moment as to matters of law cannot be compared
with American practice, state and federal, because of the essential
differences in governmental structuie.1o The Federal Courts have
never given advisory opinions. 1 Following the example set by
Massachusetts in 1780, several states have adopted constitutional
provisions making it the duty of the Court to render advisory opin-
'Opinion of The Justices, 64 N. C. 785 (1870), giving the replies of the fivejudges to a joint resolution of the Senate and House of Representatives, request-
ig opinions as to terms of the then members of the General Assembly. Pearson,
C. J., and Dick, J., expressed their willingness to follow the precedents and
give advice as an act of courtesy and respect. Rodman, J., although he declared
that a court should not undertake the political question of the "legitimacy of
the actual reigning sovereign," stated that as an individual he felt free to ex-
press his views. Reade, J., advanced several objections to the rendering of ad-
vice to a coordinate branch of the government: that the instances of such prac-
tice before 1868 were not precedents, because the duties and powers of the court
before 1868 were prescribed by an act of the legislature; that the Constitution
provides that the "Legislative, Executive and Judicial departments shall be
forever separate and distinct"; and that to consider the questions as individuals
is to evade the letter while retaining the spirit. Settle, J., declined to express
an opinion, but expressed no reason therefor.
"The Opinion of the Judges, 114 N. C. 923, 28 S. E. 18 (1894), the judges
giving an opinion, at the request of the governor, respecting the term of office
of the judges, only after the judges, whose tenures of office were affected, hadjoined in the request.. In Correspondence Between House of Representatives
of General Assembly of North Carolina and the Supreme Court of North
Carolina, 120 N. C. 623, 28 S. E. 18 (1897), the judges giving an opinion, at
the request of the House of Representatives, on the validity of a bill involving
the lease of the North Carolina Railroad.
'Leftin v. Sowers, 65 N. C. 251, 255 (1871), cites the Opinion of Justices,
supra note 7, on the question of tenure of office; Sutton v. Phillips, 116 N. C.
502, 506, 21 S. E. 968, 969 (1895), cites the Opinion of the Justices, supra note 7,
on the method of construing a constitutional provision; Rodwell v. Rowland, 137
N. C. 617, 623, 50 S. E. 319, 321 (1905), cites and quotes from the Opinion of
the Justices, supra note 7, as to the duration of a term of an elective office when
there is any doubt as to its duration; Farthing v. Carrington, 116 N. C. 315,
322, 22 S. E. 9, 10 (1895) cites the Opinion of the Justices, supra note 7,
as a precedent for construing a statute regulating preferences by mortgages,
and of general public importance, although the facts stated on the "case
agreed" were not sufficient for the court to render a final judgment.
"
0Hudson, Advisory Opinions of National and Internatiotal Courts (1924)
37 Har. L. Rev. 970.15 C. J. 785.
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ions."2 There has been, however, considerable evasion of the respon-
sibilities thus imposed. In the states which do not have such provi-
sions, there is a division of authorities, the prevailing view, supposed-
ly because of the separation of powers doctrine, being adverse to the
rendering of advisory opinions.1 3 With the single exception of Colo-
rado, in the jurisdictions which do allow advisory opinions, whether
by constitutional provisions or not, the opinions rendered are those of
the judges and not of the court.14
There is a .distinction between the advisory4 opinion and the
declaratory judgment. The former is an assistance rendered to the
other co-ordinate branches of the government, not in the determina-
tion of policies,' 5 but in the definition of certain duties or in the fore-
casting of the constitutionalty of proposed acts. The declaratory
judgment is a method of determining an issue, or issues, between
private parties in advance of trouble or litigation.' Only in the sense
that it gives anticipatory and preventative relief does it resemble an
advisory opinion. Perhaps the nearest approach to a declaratory
judgment in North Carolina is found in Farthing v. Carrington,'7
in which a statute regulating preferences by mortgages was con-
strued although the facts stated on the "case agreed" were not
sufficient for the court to render a final judgment.
The North Carolina attitude toward advisory opinions seems likely
to prevail over the traditional hostility of the American bench and
bar, if success crowns the recent efforts of Mr. Elihu Root to formu-
late a protocol which will be acceptable to the League of Nations and
which will retain the essencei without the arrogance and obscurity,
of the famed Reservation V, of the United States Senate of 1926,
stipulating the terms of the United States' adherence to the World
Court.' 8
A. K. SMITH.
15 C. J. 786, stating that Colorado, Florida, Maine, New Hampshire,
Rhode Island, and South Dakota have constitutional provisions similar to
Mass. Const. c. 3, Art. 2.
" Supra note 10, p. 977.
"Supra note 10, p. 982. "This is the justification of the repeated statement
that advisory opinions are not binding on the courts in later litigation."
"Supra note 1. For a general discussion of advisory opinions, see ARTHUR
R. ELLINGWOoD, DEPARTMENTAL CO-OPERATION IN STATE GOVERNMENT (MC-
Millan, 1918).
"For the present status of declaratory judgments in America, see Borchard,
The Supreme Court and the Declaratory Judgment (1928) 14 Am. Bar
Ass. Jour. 633.
" Farthing v. Carrington, supra note 9.
"Time, March 18, 1929, at 24, states that Reservation V stipulated that
thereafter the court must not "without the consent of the United States enter-
